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Pendley: Torts - The Dangerous Psychiatric Patient - The Doctor's Duty to

CASE NOTES
TORTS-The Dangerous Psychiatric Patient-The Doctor's Duty to Warn.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 118 Cal. Rptr.
129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974).

In the summer of 1969, Prosenjt Poddar, a student at
the University of California at Berkeley, consulted with Dr.
Lawrence Moore, a University psychotherapist. During the
course of therapy, Podder stated his intention to murder an
unnamed, but readily identifiable girl-Tatiana Tarasoff.
After consultation with other staff doctors, Moore notified the campus police and requested their assistance in
confining Poddar so that he could be committed to a mental
hospital for observation. Although the police complied with
Moore's request, they released Poddar after he was found to
be rational. Moore's superior then ordered that no action

be taken in an attempt to commit Poddair.'

Poddar sub-

sequently' discontinued treatment, and, in accordance with his
stated intent, on October 27, 1969, stabbed Tarasoff to death.'
Tarasoff 's parents filed a wrongful death action naming
Moore as a defendant and alleging a duty on Moore's part to
Copyright® 1975 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129,
130-32, 529 P.2d 553, 554-56 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as Tarasoff v.
Regents II); People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d
342, 344-45 (1974); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
33 Cal. App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1973) (hereinafter
referred to as Tarasoff v. Regents I).
2. The point at which Poddar broke off treatment appears to be in doubt.
The statement of facts by the California Supreme Court in its review of
Poddar's conviction for murder reveals that Dr. Moore notified the police
after Poddar discontinued treatment. People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 111
Cal. Rptr. 910, 912-13, 518 P.2d 342, 344-45 (1974). This statement is
supported by the fact that Dr. Moore's superior, in addition to revoking
Moore's request for detention, ordered that all notes taken by Moore during Poddar's treatment be destroyed. Tarasoff v. Regents I, 33 Cal. App.
3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1973). If Poddar was still
undergoing therapy it does not seem likely that all notes with regard to
his case would be destroyed. However, in the instant case, the California
Supreme Court wrote: "The record in People v. Poddar (citations omitted)
indicates, and plaintiffs' complaints could be amended to assert, that following Poddar's encounter with the police, Poddar broke off all contact
with the hospital staff and discontinued psychotherapy." Tarasoff v.
Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135, 529 P.2d 553, 559 (1974). As will be
seen, this particular interpretation was essential to one of the bases for
assigning a duty to the defendant.
3. People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 912-13, 518 P.2d 342,
344-45 (1974); Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132, 529 P.2d
553 (1974); Tarasoff v, Regents I, 33 CaL App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878,
880 (Ct. App. 1973).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 9

594

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

warn Tarasoff or her parents of the danger she faced.' Asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action,
the defendant demurred. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend and the case was dismissed. The California Court of Appeals, First District affirmed the trial court's
action, holding that the defendant owed no duty to Tarasoff
or her parents as a result of the relationship between the
The California Supreme
psychotherapist and Poddar
Court reversed, setting forth two bases for, liability: (1)
"[W]hen a doctor or a psychotherapist, in the exercise of
his professional skill and knowledge, determines, or should
determine, that a warning is essential to avert danger arising
from the medical or psychological condition of his patient,
he incurs a legal obligation to give that warning" ;6 and (2)
"if a defendant's prior conduct has created or contributed to
a danger, even if that conduct itself is non-negligent... the
defendent bears a duty to warn affected persons of such impending danger."
THE

LAW

OF

DUTY

The common law distinguished between misfeasance and
non-feasance and, in its reluctance to assign liability for the
latter, established a general rule that no one owes a duty
to control the conduct of others or to warn those imperiled
by such conduct? Thus, liability was not imposed for "non4. Tarasoff v. Regents II,. 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132, 529 P.2d 553, 556 (197,4).
The Tarasoffs actually sued the Regents of the University of California,
naming Dr. Moore, Dr. Stuart Gold (the doctor who initially examined
Poddar and with whom Moore consulted when he instructed the police to
apprehend Poddar), Dr. James Yandell (assistant director of the department of psychiatry and the doctor who initially authorized Moore's instruction to the police), Dr. D. Harvey Powelson ( director of the department of
psychiatry and the doctor who countermanded Moore's instruction to the
police), Chief William Beall, and Officers Gary L. Brownrigg, Joseph P.
Halleran, Everett D. Atkinson and Johnny C. Teal of the campus police.
Plaintiffs predicated liability for all defendants upon their failure to advise
the plaintiffs of the impending peril and upon their failure to confine
Poddar. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs' complaint could be
amended to state a cause of action against all named defendants. A detailed
examination of all issues in this case is obviously beyond the scop of a
note and will be confined to the action-against Dr. Moore, the. therapist
who treated Poddar.
5. Tarasoff v. Regents 1, 33 Cal. App.-3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880, 886 (Ct.
App. 1973).
6. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131, 529 P.2d 553, 555 (1974).
7. Id. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559..
8. Harper & Kine, The Duty to Control.the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L. J.
886, 887 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, comment c at 116
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feasance" except in those cases in which there existed "some
definite relation between the parties, of such a character
that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act.'' '
Once that special relationship had been established, it required not only reasonable precautions for the safety of
others (a warning for example) but also that one control
the conduct of third persons.1"
While there was no duty to aid a third person in the
absence of a special relationship, the common law concept
of misfeasance imposed a duty to avoid affirmative acts
which increased the possibility of harm to another. 1 If one
undertook such an affirmative act, he was seen as voluntarily
entering a relationship which imposed upon him responsibility
for the resulting harm to the third party."2
The doctor-patient relationship has often been construed
by the courts as imposing duties to safeguard third parties.
Thus the failure of a doctor to advise his patient of the
dangerous side effects of prescribed medication resulted in the
doctor's liability to third persons for injuries which they
received as a result of those side effects.12 A doctor was held
liable to a third person for his failure to advise his patient
that the patient's illness made it dangerous for him to drive
an automobile when the patient, as a result of his illness
caused harm to that third person. 4 The doctor's duty to third
parties is particularly evident when he treats an individual
afflicted with a contagious or infectious disease. In such
cases, the doctor has a duty "to exercise reasonable care to
advise members of the family and others, who are liable to

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

§ 315 at 118 (1965); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 56, at 338-41 (4th ed. 1971);
Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (1954); Wright v.
Arcade School District, 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814
(Ct. App. 1964).
W. PROSSER, supra note- 8, at 339; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 315-20 (1965)..
OF TORTS
W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 348; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
§§ 315-20 (1965).
OF TORTS
W. PRos ER, eu -, note 8, at 343; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§§ 321-24a (1965).
W. PROSSER, supra note. 8, at 343.
Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, 16, modified,
401 P.2d:350 (1965).
Freese v. Lemnlon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1973)); RESTATEMENT (SEC.OND) OF TORTS § 311, comment b.at 106 (1965).
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be exposed thereto, of the nature of the disease and the danger
of exposure" (emphasis added). 1 5
The duty to third parties arising out of a special relationship that exists between the defendant and another
is illustrated by the numerous cases involving mental institutions. "[W] here the hospital has notice or knowledge of facts
from which it might reasonably be concluded that a patient
would be likely to harm himself or others, unless preclusive
measures were taken, then the hospital must use reasonable
care in the circumstances to prevent such harm." (emphasis
added).l" Mental institutions have been held liable when an
outpatient left the admitting room and assaulted a third
person: (1) for their doctor's failure to inform other staff
doctors of the patient's dangerous mental condition and (2)
for their doctor's failure (when the information was communicated) to commit the individual." Releasing a mental
15. Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921). See also:
Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) where the attending
physician advised the parents of a child infected with scarlet fever that
there was no danger of contagion in seeing their daughter at the hospital
or in taking her home during the "peeling" stage. The doctor was held
liable when both parents contracted the disease. Davis v. Rodman, 147
Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921) where the treating physician failed to
advise his patient's parents (with whom he lived) and his brothers and
sisters (who lived nearby and by whom he was cared for) as to the dangers of contagion and the precautions to be taken and was held liable to the
parents and three others when they contracted typhoid fever. Despite the
the existence of a state law requiring notification of local health authorities by doctors, aware of contagious or infectious diseases, the court held
that the duty imposed "was incumbent upon the appellees regardless of the
rules and regulations of the State Board of Health on the subject." Jones
v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456, 457 (1928) where the doctor's
patient, afflicted with black smallpox, lived next door to the decedent.
When the doctor was approached by the decedent and questioned as to
the danger if he cared for his neighbor, the doctor advised him there was
no danger. The doctor was held liable when the decedent contracted black
smallpox and expired. Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d
740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1959) where defendant's doctor xrayed and examined the plaintiff, but failed to advise him or his wife that
he had tuberculosis. The doctor was held to be negligent for his failure
to warn the wife when she contracted tuberculosis.
16. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital & Medical Care Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 62
Cal. Rptr. 577, 580, 432 P.2d 193, 196 (1967). Patient in a psychiatric
ward of a hospital was known to have suicidal tendencies yet in spite of
that fact and in -spite of the attending physician's express instructions to
watch her closely, she was left unattended. While so unattended she
leaped to her death through an unsecured window.
17. Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Defendant
Barbour, knowing of Hall's homicidal tendencies- decided to admit him to
the hospital and so contacted Hamann, Before Hall could be admitted, he
left the hospital and assaulted the plaintiff. The court did not speak of a
duty to warn but held Barbour's inadequate communication to Hamann to
be negligent. The court stated that Hamann would be guilty of negligence
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patient for a work leave program without communicating a
warning to the farmer with whom he was placed as to the dangerous mental condition of the patient was held to be negligence.18 Failing to pass on to a patient's commanding officer information as to his mental condition so that he would
be denied access to firearms was also declared negligence.'
However, the mental institution cases are not directly in point
since the court in each case appeared to find negligence conduct within the hospital and not vis-a-vis a third person.
Although the courts held the defendants liable for the harm
done a third person, such a liability flowed not from a duty
to warn, but from a duty to act in a non-negligent manner in
treating a mental patient, so as to prevent potential harm to a
third person.
THE Tarasoff DECISION
The California Supreme Court propounded two possible
bases for imposing liability upon the defendant: (1) the voluntary undertaking by the defeendant of alerting the police, and
if, while aware of Hall's condition, he failed to secure his admittance. See
also Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), where the Burns
Detective Agency was hired to protect a nurse threatened by a Captain in
the United States Armed Forces. The Provost Marshal Office (PMO) had
assured the Agency that it would be advised if and when the Captain was
released. The PMO failed to so advise and the Captain killed the nurse, two
Burns detectives and then himself.
18. Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409
(D.N.D. 1967).
Newgard was committed to a Veteran's Administration
Hospital after threatening to kill his wife. Released on a work leave program without a warning to the farmer of his dangerous condition, he was
given the privilege of visiting his wife. On such a visit, Newgard murdered
her.
19. Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir 1966). An airman,
believed to be dangerous by the non-commissioned officer in charge of the
psychiatric ward, was released without a warning to his commanding officer to deny him access to firearms. The airman secured a firearm and
killed his wife. Like Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa.
1971), and Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967), the warning that was deemed necessary was not
to the one actually injured but to the one who might, when so advised,
be capable of preventing harm to a third person.
It should be noted that a mental hospital which censors letters from
patients to those outside the institution may be subject to the duty imposed
by the Tarasoff decision. If such an institution were to censor and thus
fail to send a letter containing a threat to the individual threatened and
the patient writing the letter, after his release, carried out his threat, liability could be imposed. Since the obligation of such institutions to control
their patients for the safety of third persons has been imposed consistently,
the rationale of the Tarasoff decision would seem particularly applicable.
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(2) the existence of a special relationship between the defendant and Poddar. °
When a defendant acts, even though he acts in a nonnegligent manner, and in so doing creates or contributes to a
danger, he has a duty to warn those affected. 2' This is in accordance with the general rule of the conimon law with regard to misfeasance and represents no radical step for the
court. 2 The court saw the notification of the police and
the resultant discontinuance of Poddar's treatment as an
affirmative act which increased the likelihood that Poddar
would carry out his threats. It held, therefore that the defendant had a duty to warn the Tarasoffs of the potential
danger." While the dissent would not have assigned a duty
to the defendant based upon the special relationship between the defendant and Poddar, it did agree with the
majority that "when a psychiatrist, in terminating treatment
to the patient, increases the risk of his violence, the psychiatrist must warn the potential victim.""
Recognizing that there existed no special relation between the defendant and Tarasoff, the court held that a duty
to warn arose as a result of the relation between the defendant
20. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134-35, 529 P.2d 553, 558-59
(1974).
21. Id. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965).
22. See notes 11, 12 supra.
23. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134-35, 529 P.2d 553, 558-59
(1974). See also Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242-43,
447 P.2d 352, 354-55 (1968), where the parole authority placed a youth
with known homicidal tendencies in the plaintiff's home without a warning.
The court held that by its affirmative act of placing the youth in the
plaintiff's home, the state had created a foreseeable peril and had a duty
to warn the plaintiff.
24. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 141, 529 P.2d 553, 565 (1974).
It might be contended by some that the Tarasoff case fails to go as far
as far as it would appear at first blush. Such an assertion would be based
upon the fact that the psychotherapist indicated his actual knowledge of
the danger Poddar posed by his call to the police and that in the absence
of such a clear recognition of danger by an affirmative act the psychotherapist could not be held. This could, in part, at least by implication, be the
basis for the dissent's position. Clearly the psychotherapist would have
been held liable and the plaintiffs compensated by a holding as narrow as
the dissent's. However, the majority rejected such a decision and found a
duty to exist not only as a result of the defendant's affirmative act, but
also as a result of the doctor-patient relationship and by an equation of
the dangers of physical and mental illness. The court did not propound
a subjective standard, but instead relied upon language typical of medical
malpractice: "in the exercise of his professional skill and knowledge, determines, or should determine . . . ." (emphasis added).

1,

Tarasoff v. Regents

118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 131, 529 P.2d 553, 555 (1974).
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and Poddar.25 . The court placed reliance, in part, upon the
case law involving mental institutions and their care of the
mentally ill.26 In addition, the court held that the psychotherapist's duty to warn was well within the limits of previous case law involving the doctor's duty to warn others of
contagious diseases of which the doctor has knowledge.27 The
court saw no difference between the danger from a patient afflicted with a contagious disease and the danger from a patient
suffering from a severe mental illness.28
While the law has traditionally imposed upon a physician
treating a patient afflicted with a contagious or infectious
disease a duty to warn those endangered, courts have never
placed a similar duty upon the psychotherapist. While it
may be a natural extension of tort law to place such a duty
upon the psychotherapist, the step is not as easily made as
would at first appear. The doctor or psychotherapist is not
dealing with a disease as readily ascertainable as smallpox,
scarlet fever or tuberculosis. Instead he is asked to judge
25. "Although plaintiffs' pleadings assert no special relation between Tatiana
and defendant therapists, they establish as between Poddar and defendant
therapists the special relation that arises between a patient and his doctor
or psychotherapist. Such a relationship may support affirmative duties
for the benefit of third persons." Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr.
129, 134, 529 P.2d 553, 558 (1974).
The court cited with approval the Fleming and Maximov article which
read in part: "Hospitals and the medical sciences, like other public institutions and professions, are charged with a public interest. Their image
of responsibility in our society makes them prime candidates for converting their moral duties into legal ones." Fleming & Maximov, The Patient
or His Victim: The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1031 (1974).
26. See notes 16-19 supra. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 25, at 1029 states:
The rationale behind these cases, however, does not support a distinction between inpatients and outpatients. Admittedly, the degree
of control over the latter may well be much less than over the
former, and this would certainly be relevant in determining what
protective measures could reasonably be expected, but it would not
justify a complete negation of duty. A right to control might be
a prerequisite to any duty to detain or physically restrain the
patient. It would not, however, necessarily determine whether the
therapist should have reported the matter to those with authority
to commit or should have warned a person threatened by the
patient.
While such language is persuasive it is not totally in keeping with the
holdings in the mental institution cases. As previously stated, the concern
of the courts in these cases seemed to be with the negligence of the institution in the handling of mental patients deemed to pose a danger to themselves or to others. The negligence in these cases appears based upon the
concept of misfeasance and the rendering of services. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 319, 320, 323 (1965).
The court appears on stronger
ground in basing its decision in the instant case upon the duty of the
doctor to warn others of contagious diseases.
27. See note 15 supr'a.
28. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 135, 529 P.2d 533, 559 (1974).
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and evaluate the mysterious and empirically elusive diseases
of the mind. He must determine which ones suffered by which
patients will lead to violent assaults.
Legal duties, according to the California court, axe not
"discoverable facts of nature,"2 but rather are "the sum
total of these considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 0
While the court listed the principal considerations in assigning liability, it entered into no extended discussion of these
matters.3 The four most important considerations are as
follows: the fo reseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the consequences to the community, the extent of the burden upon
the defendant and the prevalence of insurance for such a risk.
FORESEEABILITY

The defendant objected to the imposition of liability
in the instant case, claiming that to require a psychiatrist or
psychotherapist to ascertain from all the expressed thoughts
of violence he hears in therapy sessions those posing a real
danger is to require "a decision involving a high order of
expertise and judgment." 2 The court found the argument
unconvincing since a professional would be held only to "that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of [his] profession under
similar circumstances." 3 3 The court further stated that as a
29. Id. at 133, 529 P.2d at 557.
30. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 53, at 332-33 (3d ed. 1964).
31. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 564
(1968). The considerations as listed by the court in Rowland are:
[Tihe foreseeabiilty of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Rowland v. Christian, supra. The court cited a line of California cases as
revealing "an evolution from a rule of no duty to a rule in which imposition
of duty of care depends upon the foresecability of serious injury and
the burden of precautions." Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134,
529 P.2d 553, 558 (1974).
32. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136, 529 P.2d 553, 560 (1974).
33. Id.; Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal. 3d 780, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764, 478 P.2d
480, 484 (1970).
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specialist the therapist would be "held to that standard of
learning and skill normally possessed by such specialists in
the same or similar locality under the same or similar circumstances. "
Yet there is serious question as to the ability of a psychiatrist or psychotherapist to ascertain the existence of
dangerous tendencies in a patient. Numerous writers35 have
found therapists without any reliable ability to make such
determinations. "When psychiatric predictions of future
dangerous behavior have been surveyed empirically, there
has been virtually no question about the lack of accuracy concerning those predictions.""
Perhaps it is that the profession is by and large incapable
of making the decisions which the court demands by the imposition of liability for a failure to warn. Perhaps it is
that the degree of skill possessed by the profession itself
necessary for the prediction of dangerousness is so lacking
that no one therapist could ever be held liable. Yet this
case is not the first instance of society's demand and expectation of a predictive power by psychiatrists and psychotherapists. Forty-four jurisdictions presently have involuntary
commitment statutes which in effect ask the profession to
come forward and pronounce whether or not the individual
is dangerous to himself or to others.' At least one authority
contends that in some cases it is quite evident that the patient
is likely to commit a dangerous act.38 Some writers, apparent34. Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136, 529 P.2d 553, 560 (1974);
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Cal. 2d 154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580, 397
P.2d 161, 164 (1964).
35. Frederick, Dangerousness and Disturbed Behavior 2, Paper presented
before the Law and Socialization Committee in Division 9, American Psychological Association Meetings, New Orleans (Sept. 2, 1974) ; S. HALLECK,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 314 (1967); Rubin, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY, LXXVII, 405 (Sept. 1972); Steadman, Some Evidence on the
Inadequacy of the Conceptual Determination of Dangerousness in Law and
Psychiatry, 1 JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 409, 409-10 (1973); Roth,

Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency
Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400, 402-03, 411 (1973);
Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both
Ways, 4 TRIAL 29, 32 (Feb.-Mar. 1968).
36. Frederick, supra note 35.
37. Roth, Dayley & Lerner, supra note 35, at 412.
Q9- S. HALLECK, supra note 35, at 314. "Yet upon psychiatric examination it
is often surprisingly clear that some offenders are quite likely to commit a
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ly believing such evaluations are possible, feel that the decision
to warn is an ethical one and must be made by the individual
therapist without the imposition of a duty."
Certainly if the profession can make the determination
which the court demands for liability, then a duty must be
imposed." Perhaps such liability will be limited to those
extreme cases where there could have been no question as to
the danger posed. Ultimately liability for a failure to warn
will require a finding of fact as to whether the therapist exercised the requisite skill demanded by his profession.
CONSEQUENCES

To

THE COMMUNITY

The defendant argued that imposition of such a duty
would have a devastating effect on the treatment of mental
illness with resulting ramifications on society at large." The
duty to waxrn would entail a breach of trust by the violation
While recognizing "the
of confidential communications."
public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental
illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy...
and the consequent public importance of safeguarding the
confidential character of psychotherapeutic communications,"
the court found "the public interest in safety from violent assault" to be more demanding of judicial endorsement. 3 The
court's job in this difficult balancing was made somewhat
easier by the exceptions written into California's psychotherapist-patient privilege statute," as well as the Principles of
Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association. 5 Both
provide for disclosing privileged communications in the light
of dangers to society. In the words of the court: "The pxotective privilege ends where the public peril begins."" While
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

dangerous act. Too often, when medical advice is ignored, the offender's
subsequent violence provides gruesome evidence of the psychiatrist's skills."
Slovenko, P sychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE
L. REv. 175, 197-98 (1960) ; Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and
the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 633 (1964).
See note 15 supra.
Tarasoff v. Regents II, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 136, 142, 529 P.2d 553, 566,
(1974).
Id. at 136, 529 P.2d at 560.
Id. at 136-137, 529 P.2d at 550-61.
Id. at 136, 529 P.2d at 560.
Id. at 137, 529 P.2d 561.
ld.
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the California legislature, by the exceptions enacted into the
psychotherapist pivilege statute, may have engaged in a
balancing process it is important that the court balance anew,
given the duty which it contemplates assigning.
The success of psychotherapy depends to a large extent
upon the sanctity of the communications between physician
and patient. 7 Doubts as to the confidential nature of his
treatment by a prospective patient could seriously affect
his ability to seek and to receive therapy by inhibiting: (1)
his willingness to tell
his willingness to try therapy, (2)
(3) his willingness to
and
all that he should to the therapist,
8
Small scale disclosures by psychiatrust the therapist.
trists and psychotherapists of communications made by patients undergoing therapy would seem unlikely to have a significant effect on the overall mental health of the society. '
Perhaps it is as one writer contends that: "The general public
and putative patients will not lose faith in the doctor as a keeper of secrets when, in cases of emergency, he acts contrary to
strict confidentiality. Sooner or later, the patient himself
will come to realize that the doctor has acted in his interest
....115O This analysis is complicated by the tendency of psychiatrists and psychotherapists to overpredict when determining dangerousness-that is, to predict anti-social behavior
The holding in
in instances in which it would not occur."
Tarasoff combined with this tendency of overprediction may
result in massive disclosures of confidential communications
and a general, widespread knowledge of the likelihood of
violation of the privileged communications between patient
and therapist.
47. Fisher, supra note 39; Slovenko, supra note 39; M. GUTTMACHER & H.
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272-73

(1952);

Note, Psychiatrist-

Patient Privilege--A Need for the Future Crime Exception, 52 IOWA L. REV.
1170, 1178 (1967); Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege: The
GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175, 178-79
(1962).
48. See note 47 supra.
49. However, Goldstein and Katz point out: "If it should become known that
there is no privilege, and it wouid take only one sensational case to accomplish this, it is probable that a great many patients will be deterred from
coming to treatment or from participating effectively in treatment." Goldstein & Katz, supra note 47, at 179
50. Slovenko, supra note 39, at 198.

51. Dershowitz, oupra note 35.
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The therapist's argument of the devastating impact of
Tarasoff upon the field of mental health is weakened by the
realization that therapists now have the power in forty-four
jurisdictions to involuntarily commit a patient on the basis
of privileged communications between patient and physician.2
Despite this limitation on privileged communications, the
practice of psychotherapy has remained a healthy one." It
has been contended that the very limits that the law places
upon confidentiality have attracted those feeling a need,
through therapy, to "cry out for help." 4
Given the success of group therapy, especially among such
volatile groups as troubled families, perhaps confidentiality
is not as essential to effective treatment as some believe. 5
THE

BURDEN UPON THE DEFENDANT

The duty which the court imposes subjects the doctor to
the possibility of suit by the patient for the violation of his
right to the sanctity of the communications between him and
his therapist. There can be no question that such rights
exist. Numerous cases have upheld causes of action by
patients against their doctors for wrongful disclosure of
privileged communications.5 6 Yet in all cases, a recognized
52. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 25, at 1036; Roth, Dayley & Lerner, supra
note 35, at 412-13.
53.

Fleming & Maximov, supra note 25, at 1039.

54. Id.
55. Id. at 1041-43.
56.

A cause of action has been allowed as a violation of a statutory or common
law right of privacy (Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ; Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d
824, 830 (1973)), as a breach of the privileged or confidential relationship
between the physician and patient (Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208
N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79,
177 A.2d 142, 146 (1962); Home v. Patton, supra, 287 So. 2d at 827;
Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 136 (S.D. 1974)), and as a breach of
an implied contract of confidentiality (Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn.
641, 389 S.W.2d 249, 252 (1965); Home v. Patton, supra, 287 So. 2d at 832.
Some jurisdictions have ruled that the absence of a physican patient
privilege statute prevents the court from sustaining such a suit. Collins
v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957). However, other jurisdictions
have seen the code of ethics of the medical profession, the state's privilege
communications statute and the state's medical licensing statute as indicative of a policy of favoring the maintenance of such a cause of action
(Hammond v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, at 797, Horne v. Patton,
supra,287 So. 2d at 829).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/9

12

Pendley: Torts - The Dangerous Psychiatric Patient - The Doctor's Duty to

1975

CASE NOTES

defense was the existence of an overriding public interest.5
Obviously the courts are aware of the importance of such
public interests when balanced with the private rights of individuals. Clearly, in any balancing process the rights of a
patient to privacy must give way to the rights of society to be
free from violence."8
INSURANCE

Psychiatrists and psychotherapists have liability insurance and would be protected for the risk involved in the imposition of a duty to warn potential victims. Traditionally
the argument runs that the cost of Tarasoff's death should
not be borne by her parents but by the doctor (in actuality
his insurance company) and in turn (through the insurance
company) by all those who seek the help of a therapist and
assist him in paying his premiums." While insurance could
cover the doctor's failure to communicate a warning, there is
a possibility that it would not cover the doctor's intentional
revelation of a privileged communications if such revelation
57. The courts have held that such disclosures could be justified when "prompted
by the supervening interests of society . . . ." Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala.
701, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1973); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177
N.W. 831, 932 (1920); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814, 81718 (1958); Hammond v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,
799-800 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d
564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Such interests include a warning of a patient's
contagious disease (Simonsen v. Swenson, supra), a warning of a former
patient's mental instability (Berry v. Moench, supra) and a warning that
an individual employed by the government was an alcoholic (Clark v.
Geraci, supra). It would seem that the public interest of a warning given
a potential victim of a possible violent assault would serve as a defense to
an action by the patient against the doctor.
58. The doctor who communicates a warning to a potential victim could be
subject to a suit from yet another source-the victim harmed emotionally
by such a communication. Prosser, (W. PROSSR, TORTS § 54, at 327 (4th
ed. 1971)) for one, has discussed the unsettled doctrine of the negligent infliction of mental injuries. The requisite negligence could be found if the
doctor: (1) knows of the victim's precarious mental or physical health or
(2) erroneously determines that the patient intended to carry out his
threat.
59. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L. J. 499, 500, 501, 518-19 (1961). 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW
OF TORTS 762-63, 765 (1956). However, note should be made of the high
cost of insurance as a direct result of malpractice cases and the possible
effect it would have on this tradition al approach. Linster, Insuranc6 View
of Malpractice, 38 INs. COUNSEL J. 528 (1971): "Many companies have
discontinued writing medical malpractice insurance and most, if not all,
of the forty companies which have continued to provide this type of protection for doctors have not found the decision to remain in business an
easy one."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 9

606

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

VOl. X

was found to be without justification." If such is the case,
the doctor, aware of the limitations of his insurance policy,
may choose not to warn, risking liability and subsequent total
indemnification (within the limits of his policy) rather than
to risk being without defense in the revelation of a privileged
communication and being forced to bear the entire judgment.
CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court, by assigning to psychiatrists aware of the dangerous proclivities of their patients the
same duty which the law has assigned to doctors aware of
their patients' contagious diseases the court took what must be
called a natural step. However, while the move was a logical
progression of previous case law, it took the court one step
beyond the irelative certainty of medicine into the often uncertain world of psychiatry.
WILLIAM PIERRY PENDLEY

60. See note 57 8upr.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss2/9

14

